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I. Introduction
Revision games (see Kamada and Kandori 2017; Calcagno et al. 2014) 
model a situation in which players can prepare their actions during a 
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Revision games model a situation in which players can prepare 
their actions during a pre-play phase. We introduce one-sided 
incomplete information in two coordination games, one of common 
interest and one of opposing interest, and study how the pre-play 
phase affects coordination. We find that in the common interest 
game, the unique Bayesian equilibrium is such that the informed 
player will signal the state of the world through her prepared action, 
unless the pre-play phase is about to finish, in which case she 
seeks to coordinate with the other player. In the opposing interest 
game, the equilibrium is similar when the informed player is the 
one receiving less opportunity to revise her actions. When it is the 
uninformed player who receives less revision opportunities, we show 
that it is possible no information is revealed if both players are 
initially coordinated, but some information must be revealed if they 
are initially miscoordinated.
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pre-play phase. At the end of the pre-play phase, the action profile last 
prepared by players is implemented and players receive the corresponding 
stage-game payoff. Revision opportunities are stochastic and arrive 
according to independent Poisson processes. There is therefore a 
positive probability that a player might no longer be able to revise his 
prepared action before the deadline. While Kamada and Kandori (2017) 
show that with a continuum of actions the addition of a pre-play phase 
can increase the set of equilibrium payoffs, Calcagno et al. (2014) show 
that it can also narrow it down in finite games.
In this paper we introduce one-sided incomplete information in two co- 
ordination games, one of common interest and one of opposing interest, 
and study how coordination is affected. In particular we study how 
information is or is not transmitted through the prepared action of the 
informed player. 
In the common interest game, players wish to coordinate on a risky 
action which depends on the state of the world, only known by one of 
the players. We show that there is a unique equilibrium with the 
following features: first, the informed player will not signal her private 
information when close to the deadline; second, the uninformed player 
always coordinates with the informed player.
In the opposing interest game, players wish to coordinate, though not 
on the same action. Which action is preferred by each player depends 
on the state of the world, only know to one of the players. There is a 
tension between cooperation and competition, and revealing too much 
information might be detrimental to the informed player. We show that 
when players are initially coordinated, it is possible that no information 
is transmitted, while when players are initially miscoordinated, some 
information transmission will occur.
II. Setting
In this section we describe the characteristics of a revision game with 
one-sided incomplete information in which players seek to coordinate 
on an action which depends on the state of the world. We first describe 
the Bayesian game and the preparation stage. We then illustrate how 
the uninformed player revises his beliefs. Finally we describe histories, 
strategies, and define the equilibrium concept used in the Bayesian 
revision game.
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A. The Bayesian Game
We consider in turns two coordination games: a common interest 
coordination game, presented in Figure 1, and an opposing interest 
coordination game, presented in Figure 2.
In both games, there are two players, N = {1, 2}, two states of the world 
Ω = {a, b } and two actions for each player, S1 = S2 = {A, B }. In both 
cases, players weakly prefer to be coordinated than not coordinated. 
In the common-interest game, both players would like to coordinate on 
the action that corresponds to the state of the world. In the opposing-
interest game, Player 1 prefers if both players coordinate on the action 
that matches the state of the world, while Player 2 prefers coordination 
on the other action.
We assume that Player 1 (she) knows the state of the world while Player 
2 (he) is uninformed and has a uniform prior belief: p(a ) = p(b ) = 1/2.
B. Timing and Revision Opportunities
Time goes from –T < 0 to 0. A positive time t > 0 denotes the time 
remaining until the deadline (t = 0). At – T, an action profile (s1, s2) 
∈ S1 × S2 is exogenously given. From –T to 0, players then receive 
stochastic opportunities to revises their actions according to two 
independent Poisson processes with arrival rates λ1 and λ2. In particular, 
Figure 1
A BAyesiAn Common interest CoordinAtion GAme (d > 1) 
A B A B
A d,d 0,1 A 1,1 1,0
B 1,0 1,1 B 0,1 d,d
ω = a ω = b
Figure 2
A BAyesiAn opposinG interest CoordinAtion GAme (d > 1) 
A B A B
A d,1 0,0 A 1,d 0,0
B 0,0 1,d B 0,0 d,1
ω = a ω = b
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the probability that revision opportunities are simultaneous is zero. At 
t = 0, the last prepared action profile is implemented and payoffs are 
realized.
It is important to note that a player is not aware of the other player’s 
revision opportunities unless they revised their prepared action.
C. Histories
Let kit−  be the time at which Player i receives her kth revision 
opportunity, and oit−  : = –T and let ki(t) be the number of revision 
opportunities received by Player i in [–T, −t). Let kiX  ∈ {A, B} be the ac-
tion prepared by Player i at time kit−  and Xi(t) be the action prepared 
by Player i at time −t. Finally let ri(t) ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether Player i 
received a revision opportunity at time −t.
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That is, a history indicates the state of the world, all the revision 
opportunities received up to and including time −t and specifies the pre-
pared actions up to, but not including, time −t.
A player only knows about revision opportunities of the other player 
if she observes a change in the prepared action. Therefore a private 
history for player i takes the form of:
hi(t) = si ∪
( ) ( )
0
( )( )
0( ) , ( ( )}.{ , , ) ,ji
k tk k f k




k jt X X r tt ==
where, si is the signal of player i, f(0) = 0 and ( )f kjt  is the first time 
after ( 1)f kjt
−  such that ( ) ( 1)f k f kj jX X
−≠ . Since player 1 is the only play-
er informed, we have s1(ω) = ω, while s2(ω) = ϕ. The set of all private 
histories for Player i is denoted by Hi.
D. Strategies
A strategy for Player i is a mapping σi : Hi → {ϕ} × ∆(Si) such that 
σ i(hi(t )) = ϕ if r i(t ) = 0. (That is, a player can choose an action only 
when having a revision opportunity.) A pair of strategies (σ1, σ2), along 
with the Poisson processes, generate a measure Pσ1,σ2 on the set of 
prepared actions at the deadline, (X1(0), X2(0)).
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E. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
A strategy profile ( 1 2,σ σ
∗ ∗ ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the 
revision game if for any history hi(t ) such that r i(t ) = 1 and any strate-
gy σi, we have that
, ,[ ( (0), (0))| ( )] [ ( (0), (0))| ( )],i j i ji i j i i i j iu X X h t u X X h tσ σ σ σ∗ ∗ ∗≥ 
i = 1, 2, and Player 2’s beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever 
possible.
F. Belief Updating of Player 2
To illustrate how the uninformed player may revise his beliefs, let us 
assume that Player 1 revises her action only to signal the correct state 
of the world. Let X ∈ {A, B } denote the initial action of Player 1 and let 
px(t) denote Player 2’s belief that the state is x ∈ {a, b } when t > 0 is 
remaining until the deadline. If Player 1 has revised her action, given 
that this is interpreted as a signal, Player 2’s belief falls to px(t) = 0.
Consider now the case in which Player 1 has not revised her action 
since the beginning of the game (that is, for a time interval of length 
T – t). If Player 1 has not yet revised her prepared action, it could be 
because (i) the state is x, which occurs with probability 1/2, or (ii) the 
state is y and Player 1 did not get a revision opportunity, which occurs 










The beliefs of Player 2 when Player 1 has not revised her prepared 
action are illustrated in Figure F for a preparation phase of length 1 and 
when Player 1 has on average either 0.5, 1 or 2 revision opportunities 
per unit of time. Note that when Player 1 has not revised her prepared 
action we have:
1 If x ∈ {a, b} we use y to denote {a, b} \ {x }, and similarly for X and Y in {A, B}.
2 Note that in Calcagno et al. (2014) revision opportunities are observed 
by both players, although it does not matter as there are no information 
asymmetries.
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III. Common Interest Game
In this section we characterize the unique equilibrium of the Bayesian 
common interest revision game, for which payoffs have been reproduced 
in Figure 4 below.
Theorem 1. There exists τ1 > 0 such that, in the unique equilibrium of 
the Bayesian common interest revision game:
•  When t ≥ τ1 (when enough time remains to the deadline), Player 1 sig-
nals the state of the world; when t ≤ τ1 (the deadline is close), Player 
1 coordinates with Player 2.
•  On the equilibrium path, Player 2 always coordinates with Player 1. 













=  + −     
(4)
The proof of Theorem 1 consists in three steps. First, we show that in 
any equilibrium, close to the deadline, Player 1 does not wish to signal 
the state of the world (Proposition 1). Therefore there is always a positive 
probability that player 1 chooses to disregard her private information. 
In particular, if the preparation stage is too short, no information is 
transmitted.
We then characterize Player 2’s behavior when Player 1 chooses to 
signal the state of the world through her action, and show that Player 2 
always wish to be coordinated with Player 1 (Proposition 2).
Finally we show that, when the preparation stage is long enough, 
Player 1 will always want to signal the state of the world, proving the 
uniqueness of equilibrium (Proposition 3).
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A. No Signalling Close to the Deadline
We first show that close to the deadline, Player 1 will prefer to be 
coordinated on the wrong action rather signal the correct state of the 
world. This is because close to the deadline the probability that a future 
revision opportunity arises is too small relative to the benefit of being 
coordinated on the correct action.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, there is a length of time τ > 0 
such that when t ≤ τ remains until the deadline, Player 1 prefers to 
be coordinated with Player 2 on the wrong action rather than being 
miscoordinated. Moreover τ ≥ τ1, where τ1 is given by (4).
Proof. Let us assume that at any revision opportunity Player 2 seeks 
to coordinate with Player 1. This is the most favourable case for Player 
1 and will therefore gives us the lower bound on τ, τ ≥ τ1. Given Player 
Figure 3
Player 2’s Beliefs When Player 1 has not revised her PrePared action
(T = 1, λ1 = 0.5, 1, 2)
Figure 4
a Bayesian common interest coordination Game (d > 1) 
A B A B
A d,d 0,1 A 1,1 1,0
B 1,0 1,1 B 0,1 d,d







–1             –0.8          –0.6          –0.4          –0.2
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2’s behavior, we are interested in two different values for Player 1: (i ) the 
value of being coordinated with Player 2 on the wrong action and (ii ) the 
value of being miscoordinated with Player 2 while preparing the correct 
action.
Let V(X1, X2, x, t) denote the value to Player 1 when she is preparing 
action X1, Player 2 is preparing action X2, the state of the world is x, 
and there is t that remains until the deadline. In particular, we are 
interested in the values V(Y, Y, x, t) and V(X, Y, x, t), in which either 
players are coordinated on the wrong state of the world or players are 
miscoordinated by Player 1’s action matches with the state of the world. 
Consider now a small interval of time dt:
•  Player 1 receives a revision opportunity with probability 1 – e–λ1dt
 
~ 
λ1dt. She can then choose between being coordinated on the wrong 
action or signal the correct state of the world.
•  Player 2 receives a revision opportunity with probability 1 – e–λ2dt
 
~ 
λ2dt and will coordinate with Player 1 if players are miscoordinated.
Therefore the value of being coordinated on the wrong action for Player 
1 satisfies the following equation:
 V (Y, Y, x, t) ~ λ1dt max{V (Y, Y, x, t – dt), V (X, Y, x, t – dt)} 
                               + (1 – λ1dt)V (Y, Y, x, t – dt).
By subtracting V(Y, Y, x, t – dt). from both sides, dividing by dt, and let-
ting dt go to zero, we obtain the following Bellman equation:
 Vt (Y, Y, x, t) = λ1 max{V (X, Y, x, t) − V (Y, Y, x, t), 0},  (5)
where Vt (Y, Y, x, t) is the total derivative of V (Y, Y, x, t) with respect to 
t, the time left until the deadline. Note that Vt (Y, Y, x, t ) ≥ 0, so that the 
value weakly decreases as the deadline approaches.
Similarly, we have the following Bellman equation for V (X, Y, x, t ): 
Vt (X, Y, x, t) = λ1 max{V (Y, Y, x, t) – V (X, Y, x, t), 0} + λ2[d – V (X, Y, x, t)].  (6)
The second term corresponds to Player 2 having a revision opportunity, 
in which case he will coordinate with Player 1 on the correct action, 
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yielding a payoff of d for both players. Note that we also have Vt(X, Y, 
x, t) ≥ 0 as d is the highest payoff in the game.
We first note that when it is optimal for Player 1 to be coordinated on 
the wrong action, it remains so until the deadline. When V (Y, Y, x, t) – 
V (X, Y, x, t) ≥ 0, it is optimal for Player 1 to be coordinated with Player 
2 on the wrong action. In that case, (5) and (6) become
 Vt(Y, Y, x, t) = 0,  (7)
and
Vt (X, Y, x, t) = λ1[V (Y, Y, x, t) – V (X, Y, x, t)] + λ2[d – V (X, Y, x, t)].  (8)
Because V (Y, Y, x, t) is constant and V (X, Y, x, t) is decreasing as 
the deadline approaches, if V (Y, Y, x, t) – V (X, Y, x, t ) ≥ 0 then V(Y, 
Y, x, t' ) – V (X, Y, x, t' ) ≥ 0 for t' ≤ t: when it is optimal for Player 1 to 
remain coordinated on the wrong action, it continues to be so until the 
deadline. This implies that
 V (Y, Y, x, t) = V (Y, Y, x, 0) = 1,  (9)
and we can therefore rewrite (8) as
 Vt (X, Y, x, t) + (λ1 + λ2)V (X, Y, x, t) = λ1 + λ2d.  (10)
Along with the terminal condition V(X, Y, x, 0) = 0,3 this gives us (see 
Appendix A.a) for a calculation)
 
1 2 1 2( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( , , , ) (1 ) (1 ) .t tV X Y x t e e dλ λ λ λλλ
λ λ λ λ
− + − += − + −











3 See either the top-right entry of the left matrix or the bottom-left entry of the 
right matrix in Figure 1.
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Player 1 gets the first revision opportunity before the deadline and 
chooses to coordinate with Player 2 on the wrong action, yielding a 
payoff of 1. With probability
 1 2( )2
1 2





Player 2 gets the first revision opportunity before the deadline and 
coordinates with Player 1 on the correct action, yielding a payoff of d. 
Finally with the complementary probability no player gets a revision 
opportunity before the deadline and Player 1 gets a payoff of 0.
The time τ1 which remains until the deadline and for which Player 
1 is indifferent between being coordinated on the wrong action or 
miscoordi-nated while choosing the correct action is then defined by 
V (X, Y, x, τ1) = V (Y, Y, x, τ1) = 1, that is:
 
1 2 1 1 2 1( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
(1 ) (1 ) 1,e e dλ λ τ λ λ τλλ
λ λ λ λ
− + − +− + − =















=  + − 
as in (4).
Note that Player 1 is willing to remain miscoordinated longer as 























2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
1 ln 0.




λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
 +∂
= − − < 
∂ + − + +   
195BAYESIAN REVISION GAMES
If λ1 increases then Player 1 will have more opportunities to coordinate 
with Player 2 in the future and is therefore willing to remain uncoordi-
nated longer. Similarly, if λ2 increases then there are more chances that 
Player 2 will be able to coordinate on the correct action with Player 1 in 
the future and therefore Player 1 is willing to signal the correct action 
longer.
Proposition 1 tells us that close to the deadline Player 1 will prefer 
to be coordinated with Player 2 on the wrong action rather than signal 
the correct action through miscoordination. This is because close to 
the deadline the risk of miscoordination becomes too important, as it 
is unlikely that Player 2 will have a revision opportunity and be able 
to coordinate with Player 1 on the correct action. Therefore if given a 
revision opportunity Player 1 will prefer to coordinate with Player 2 on 
the wrong action.
Proposition 1 also characterizes Player 2’s best reply off the path of 
an informative equilibrium, that is when Player 1 first signals the state 
of the world by changing her prepared action and then changes her pre-
pared action a second time before τ1 is left until the deadline:
Corollary 1. In an informative equilibrium, when Player 1 has signalled 
the state of the world, Player 2 will choose to prepare the corresponding 
action until τ2 is left to the deadline, irrespective of Player 1’s prepared 
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for any d > 1, λ1 > 0, and λ2 > 0.













=  + −   
 (13)
B. The Uninformed Player Always Prefers To Be Coordinated
We now characterize Player 2’s behaviour in an equilibrium where 
Player 1 signals the state of the world until τ1 and show that Player 2 
always prefers to be coordinated with Player 1, whether or not the state 
has been revealed.
Note that if players are miscoordinated, when Player 2 does not 
know the state, only one revision opportunity is required for players 
to coordinate on the correct action. On the other hand, if players are 
coordinated, it might require either zero or two revision opportunities for 
players to coordinate on the correct action. What Proposition 2 tells us is 
that there is no option value in being miscoordinated, when the prior is 
uniform. If the prior was not uniform then the uninformed player might 
have an incentive to choose miscoordination while waiting for new 
information to unfold.
Proposition 2. In an equilibrium where Player 1 signals the state of the 
world with her action then, on the equilibrium path, Player 2 always 
wishes to be coordinated with Player 1.
Proof. Consider the following strategy for Player 1: prepare the 
correct action until τ1 remains to the deadline, after which try to 
coordinate with Player 2. That is,
   if t ≥ τ1 and r1(t) = 1,
1
2








    if t < τ1 and r1(t) = 1.
Note that this strategy is optimal for Player 1 as long as Player 2 is will-
ing to coordinate with Player 1 for t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + ε), ε > 0.
5
Let
U(X1(t), X2(t), p(t), t)
denote Player 2’s value function when
5 This is because from Proposition 1 τ1 is the last time Player 1 is willing to 
prepare the correct action given that Player 2 will coordinate with Player 1.
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• t is left until the deadline,
• the prepared action profile is (X1(t), X2(t)),
• Player 2’s belief about X1(t), the action prepared by Player 1, is p(t).
Let X denote Player 1’s initial action. We first find Player 2’s best 
response when the deadline is close, and then when it is far.
Case 1: the deadline is close (t ≤ τ1)
When t ≤ τ1 we know that Player 1 will try to coordinate with Play-
er 2 irrespective of the state of the world. When Player 1 has revised her 
prepared action before τ1 and therefore signalled the state of the world 
to Player 2, we have
 U (Y, Y, 1, t) = d,  (14)
and
 
1 2 1 2( ) ( )2 2
1 2 1 2
( , ,1, ) (1 ) 1 (1 ).t tU Y X t e d eλ λ λ λλ λ
λ λ λ λ
− + − += − + − −










Player 2 is the first to obtain a revision opportunity and will coordinate 
to get a payoff of d. With the complementary probability either Player 1 
revises her action first or no player receives a revision opportunity, in 
which case Player 2’s payoff at the deadline is 1.
If Player 1 has not revised her action before τ1 then learning stops at 
τ1 and Player 2’s belief is given by
  
1 11 ( )
1( ) ( ) (1/2,1)
1
x x
Tp t p e λ τ
τ − −= = ∈+
 
and Player 2’s value is
 U(X, X, px(τ1), t) = p
x(τ1)d + p
y(τ1).  (16)
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We now check that when Player 1 has not revised her action prior to τ1 
then Player 2 prefers to be coordinated with Player 1 for t ≤ τ1. Assume 
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 = − + +
 + − + +
+
 (17)
If Player 2 is the first to have a revision opportunity then he will coor- 
dinate with Player 1 on X and have an expected payoff of px(τ1)d + p
y(τ1). 
If Player 1 is the first to have a revision opportunity then she will coor- 




x(τ1) > 1/2. Finally if no player receives a revision 
opportunity then Player 2 gets a payoff of 1 only if the state is x. Hence 
U(X, Y, px(τ1), t) < U(X, X, p
x(τ1), t) for any t ≤ τ1.
Note that from the continuity of the value functions, it will also be 
strictly better for Player 2 to coordinate with Player 1 if Player 1 has not 
yet revised her action and if t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + ε), for some ε > 0 sufficiently 
small. This will turn out to be of importance when showing uniqueness 
of equilibrium.
Case 2: the deadline is far (t ≥ τ1)
As above, we still have U(Y, Y, 1, t) = d. When Player 1 has signalled 
the state by changing her prepared action, we know that she will wait 
until τ1 is left before trying to coordinate with Player 2 on the wrong ac-
tion again. Therefore if Player 2 obtains a revision opportunity before 
–τ1 his payoff will be d. If not his payoff will be U(Y, X, 1, τ1), where U(Y, X, 
1, τ1) is given by (15), evaluated at t = τ1, and we have
 U(Y, X, 1, t) = (1 − e−λ2(t − τ1))d + e−λ2(t − τ1)U(Y, X, 1, τ1).  (18)
To find Player 2’s value functions when Player 1 has not yet revised her 
prepared action, U(X, X, px(t), t) and U(X, Y, px(t), t), we first assume that 
if Player 2 has a revision opportunity he will choose to be coordinated 
with Player 1: U(X, X, px(t), t) ≥ U(X, Y, px(t), t). We  know that this is true 
for t = τ1 and by continuity it will also be true in a neighborhood of τ1. 
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We then get the following first-order ordinary differential equation for 
U(X, X, px(t), t):
Ut(X, X, p
x(t), t) + λ1p
y(t)U(X, X, px(t), t) = λ1p
y(t)U(Y, X, 1, t),
where Ut(X, X, p
x(t), t) is the total derivative of U(X, X, px(t), t) with 
respect to t.6 This is because in a small time interval dt, Player 2 expects 
Player 1 to revise her prepared action if the state is y and if she receives 
a revision opportunity, which occurs with probability ~ py(t)λ1dt. If that 
is the case then Player 2 gets the value U(Y, X, 1, t), which is given by (18). 
Given the the terminal condition (16) we obtain (see Appendix A.b)):7
2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
1 2
( , , ( ), ) ( )
( ) 1




U X X p t t p t d
p t e e d
e e U Y X e
λ τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ λ τ
λλ
λ λ λ λ
λ τ
λ λ
− − − −
− − − − − −
=
 + − + − − 
+ − + 
− 
 (19)
When the state is x, which occurs with probability px(t), Player 2 will 
receive a payoff of d, as none of the players will revise their actions. The 
term within braces corresponds to the payoff of Player 2 when the state 
is y, which occurs with probability py(t). It it composed of three terms:
•  The first term in brackets is the probability that during a time inter-
val of length t – τ1 Player 1 obtains a revision opportunity and Player 
2 obtains a subsequent revision opportunity, in which case both 
players receive a payoff of d.
•  With probability
6 That is, let h(t) = U(X, X, px(t), t). Then Ut(X, X, p
x(t), t) denotes h'(t).
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2 1 1 1( ) ( )1
1 2
( )t te eλ τ λ τλ
λ λ
− − − −−
−
, 
Player 1 will have a revision opportunity while Player 2 will not get 
a subsequent revision opportunity until τ1, in which case Player 2’s 
value at τ1 is U(Y, X, 1, τ1).
•  Finally, with probability e−λ1(t −τ1) Player 1 does not get a revision 
opportunity until τ1 and players remain coordinated on the wrong 
action, which yields a payoff of 1.
We now find U(X, Y, px(t), t), while still assuming that U(X, X, px(t), 
t) ≥ U(X, Y, px(t), t), so that if Player 2 has a revision opportunity he will 
change his prepared action and coordinate with Player 1. Again with 
probability ~ py(t)λ1dt Player 1 will change his prepared action to y, this 
time giving a payoff of d. We therefore obtain the following first-order 
ordinary differential equation for U(X, Y, px(t), t):
 Ut(X, Y, p
x(t), t) + (λ1p
y(t) + λ2)U(X, Y, p
x(t), t)
 = λ1p
y(t)d + λ2U(X, X, p
x(t), t),
where Ut(X, Y, p
x(t), t) is the total derivative of U (X, Y, px(t), t) with re-
spect to t and U(X, X, px(t), t) is given by (19). Along with the terminal 
condition for U(X, Y, px(τ1), τ1) given by (17) and evaluated at t = τ1, we 
find (see Appendix A.c))
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We now focus on the sign of the difference U(X, Y, px(t), t) – U(X, X, px(t), 
t), which is of the same sign as
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Equation (21) is the average of two terms (independent of t) weighted by 
px(t) and py(t). Since U(X, Y, px(τ1), τ1) – U(X, X, p
x(τ1), τ1) < 0 and d – U(Y, X, 
1, τ1) > 0, the term weighted by p
x(t) must be negative.
Therefore if U(X, Y, px(t), t) – U(X, X, px(t), t) < 0 then U(X, Y, px(t' ), t' ) 
– U(X, X, px(t' ), t' ) < 0 for any t' < t. That is, if the uninformed player 
prefers to be coordinated with the informed player, he will continue to 
do so in the future. This is because as t decreases, the weight on the 
negative term in (21), px(t), increases.
We now look for the sign of U(X, Y, px(t), t) – U(X, Y, px(t), t) at the start 
of the game, when t = T. Note that at t = T, we have px(t) = py(t) = 1/2. 
Therefore we need to determine the sign of
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which can be simplified into8
 













This shows that U(X, Y, px(t), t) – U(X, X, px(t), t) < 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ], 
so that Player 2 will always prefer to remain coordinated with Player 1.
Propositions 1 and 2 therefore prove the existence of an informative 
equilibrium when T ≥ τ1, with the following strategies:
•  Player 1:
-  At any revision opportunity such that t ≥ τ1, prepare the action 
8 Recall that U(X, X, px(τ1), τ1) = p
x(τ1)d + p
y(τ1), 
U(Y, X, 1, τ1) = 1 2 1 1 2 1
( ) ( )2 2
1 2 1 2
(1 ) 1 (1 )e d eλ λ τ λ λ τλ λ
λ λ λ λ




U(X, Y, 0, τ1) = 1 2 1 1 2 1
( ) ( )2 1
1 2 1 2
(1 ) (1 ) .e e dλ λ τ λ λ τλ λ
λ λ λ λ
− + − +− + −
+ +
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that corresponds to the correct state of the world.
-  At any revision opportunity such that t ≤ τ1, coordinate with Player 2.
•  Player 2
-  If his belief about a state of the world is 1, play the corresponding 
action until τ2 remains to the deadline. After that coordinate with 
Player 1.
- If Player 2’s beliefs are interior, always coordinate with Player 1.
•  Beliefs of Player 2: Player 2’s beliefs jump to zero or one when 
Player 1 changes her prepared action before τ1 is left until the 
deadline. When Player 1 does not revise her prepared action then 
Player 2’s belief is given by (1) until τ1 and then remains constant.
Moreover the payoffs from such an informative equilibrium converge 
to the efficient payoff, d, as T becomes arbitrarily large. This is because 
as T becomes arbitrarily large then so does T − τ1.
C. Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this section we point out why the equilibrium characterized in the 
previous sections is unique:
Proposition 3. The informative equilibrium described in the previous 
sub-section is the unique equilibrium of the Bayesian revision game with 
one-sided incomplete information.9
Proof. We argue now that there cannot be another equilibrium than 
the informative equilibrium described previously. From equations (16) 
and (17), we saw that U(X, Y, px(τ1), τ1) < U(X, X, p
x(τ1), τ1). That is, Player 
2 will coordinate with Player 1 at t = τ1, and by continuity of the value 
functions, for t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + ε), for ε > 0 small enough. Since Player 1 
is willing to stay miscoordinated with Player 1 until t = τ1 in order to 
signal the correct state of the world, she will find it optimal to do so as 
this gives her the highest expected payoff. Therefore, there cannot be 
another equilibrium.
9 Note that even though we call it an informative equilibrium, there is always 
a phase, close to the deadline, where no information is transmitted. If the 




In a common interest coordination game, one-sided incomplete 
information does not affect the informed player’s behavior. She will be 
willing to stay miscoordinated until τ1 remains until the deadline, in 
order to signal the correct state of the world. The uninformed player will, 
when given the opportunity, always coordinate with the informed player 
in particular, there is no option value from being miscoordinated, even 
when the beliefs of the uninformed player have not been updated.
However, this will not be the case if we depart from a uniform prior 
belief; for example, if player 2 puts a very strong prior probability on x 
being the state of the world, he will prepare action X even though this 
might induce miscoordination.
IV. Opposing Interest Games
We now study a coordination game with opposing interests, reproduced 
below in Figure 5. In this game both players would like to coordinate 
and receive a payoff of either d > 1 or 1, as being miscoordinated yields 
a payoff of zero. When the state of the world is a, Player 1 prefers to 
be coordinated on action A while Player 2 prefers to be coordinated on 
action B. When the state of the world is b, it is the reverse, where Player 
1 prefers to be coordinated on action B, while Player 2 prefers to be 
coordinated on action A. The state of the world therefore represents the 
preference of Player 1.
When there is no incomplete information, then Calcagno et al. (2014, 
Theorem 3) show that which action profile players coordinate on de-
pends on the relative arrival rates. They determine that the “stronger” 
player is the one with the lowest arrival rate.10 For example, when λ1 < 
λ2, Player 1 is the strong player and if the preparation phase is suffi-
ciently long, the prepared action profile at the deadline will be the one 
preferred by Player 1. The reason is that close to the deadline, both play-
ers will try to coordinate with each other, irrespective of the action pro-
file currently prepared. If Player 2 has on average more revision oppor-
tunities than Player 1, then Player 1 is willing to remain miscoordinated 
longer, which forces Player 2 to coordinate on her own preferred action.
10 The condition also depends on payoffs, which do not enter into consider-
ation here because of symmetry.
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With one-sided incomplete information, things remain the same if the 
informed player is the stronger player. That is, when λ1 < λ2, Player 1 
will always signal the state of the world by preparing her preferred ac-
tion, and Player 2 will always coordinate with Player 1. (Note that in the 
case of perfect information, the weak player has an incentive to misco-
ordinate with the strong player in anticipation of a future change of the 
strong player’s prepared action. This is no longer the case here.)
However when λ1 > λ2 this is no longer an equilibrium. Indeed Player 
2 is now the strong player, and if he is informed of the state by Player 
1’s action, he will prepare his preferred action and force Player 1 to co-
ordinate with him. Therefore when λ1 > λ2 information is no longer fully 
transmitted. We show that there is an equilibrium in which, when play-
ers start the game coordinated, they remain so until the end, without 
revising their prepared actions. We then show that in any equilibrium, 
if players start the game miscoordinated, there must be some degree of 
information transmission.
A. Player 1 is the “Strong” Player: λ1 < λ2
When Player 1 is the strong player, we argue that equilibrium 
is similar to the perfect information case (see Calcagno et al. 2014, 
Theorem 3), so that player will coordinate on the preferred action of 
Player 1. However, unlike in the perfect information case, the weak 
player (in this case player 2) has no incentives to miscoordinate with the 
strong player in anticipation of a future revision of the strong player’s 
prepared action. This would not be the case if the prior beliefs were 
initially skewed rather than uniform. Namely, equilibrium takes the 
following form:
Proposition 4. In an opposing interest coordination game, when λ1 < λ2, 
the unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revision game is as 
Figure 5
A BAyesiAn opposinG interest CoordinAtion GAme (d > 1) 
A B A B
A d,1 0,0 A 1,d 0,0
B 0,0 1,d B 0,0 d,1
ω = a ω = b
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follows:
•  Player 1 always prepares her preferred action until τ1, after which 
she coordinates with Player 2 if players are miscoordinated;
• Player 2 always coordinates with Player 1.
Proof. Let us first assume that both players know the state of the 
world (for example if it has been revealed by Player 1’s action). At the 
deadline, both players strictly prefer to be coordinated. By continuity of 
the value functions, this is again true close to the deadline. Moreover, 
assuming Player 2 always coordinates with Player 1, we know that 















remains until the deadline before coordinating with Player 2. Similarly, 
if Player 1 always coordinates with Player 2, then Player 2 is willing to 














+ −  
remains until the deadline. As λ1 < λ2, we have that τ1 < τ2. That is, 
Player 1 is willing to wait closer to the deadline than Player 2 before 
coordinating on Player 2’s preferred action. Therefore Player 1 will 
always signal the state of the world by preparing her preferred action, 
and Player 2 will coordinate with Player 1.
Let us now determine the behavior of Player 2 when Player 1 has not 
yet revised her action, so that the state of the world is unknown to 





T tp t e λ− −
=
+  
until τ1 remains until the deadline, after which the belief no longer 
changes.
Case 1: the deadline is close (t ≤ τ1)
Consider first the case t ≤ τ1. Because τ1 ≤ τ2, we also have t ≤ τ2. By 
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definition of τ2 we therefore have 
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which can be rewritten as
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 (24)
Let U(X, X, px(t), t) and U(X, Y, px(t), t) denote the value to Player 
2 of being coordinated and miscoordinated with Player 1 respectively, 
when Player 1 has not yet revised her action. Assuming U(X, X, px(t), t) 
≥ U(X, Y, px(t), t), and given Player 1’s strategy, we have:
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Therefore U(X, X, px(t), t) ≥ U (X, Y, px(t), t) is equivalent to
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which is implied by (24). This is because the left-hand side of (24) has 
decreased (px(τ1)d + p
y(τ1) ≤ d) while the right-hand side has increased 
(px(τ1) + p
y(τ1)d ≥ 1).
Case 2: the deadline is far (t ≥ τ1)
Assuming that U(X, X, px(t), t) ≥ U(X, Y, px(t), t), and following 
calculations similar to the ones in Appendices A.b) and A.c), we find:
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We now argue that the difference U(X, Y, px(t), t) − U(X, X, px(t), t) is 
non-positive. For t = T , this difference is proportional to
 [ ]1




1 ( , ,1, ) ( , , ( ), ) 1 ( , ,1, )
( )




U Y X U X X p U Y X
p
e U Y X dτ
τ τ τ τ
τ
τ− −
 − + − 
= − <
where we used the fact that U(X, X, px(τ1), τ1) = p
x(τ1) + p
y(τ1)d. It then 
suffice to notice that the difference is decreasing as t decreases, as the 
term in front of px(t) is negative and px(t) increases as t decreases.
B. Player 2 is the “Strong” Player: λ1 > λ2
When Player 1 is the weak player, she no longer has incentives to fully 
reveal the state of the world. This is because Player 2, being the strong 
player and knowing the state of the world, will prepare his preferred ac-
tion until τ2 remains to the deadline, and Player 1 will yield as τ1 > τ2.
For example, if the initial prepared action profile is (X, Y ) and the 
state is y, if Player 1 revises her action to Y , then Player 2 will, if given 
the opportunity before τ2, prepare the action X, giving rise to the pre-
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pared action profile (Y, X ). However, if Player 2 does not get a revision 
opportunity in time, the prepared action profile at the deadline will be 
(Y, Y ), which is preferred by Player 1. Therefore, though Player 1 might 
have incentives to conceal the true state of the world, she will do so if 
she gets a revision opportunity close to τ2, which will leave little oppor-
tunity for Player 2 to revise his action and try to impose his preferred 
action profile.
We show two results. First, that there is an equilibrium in which, 
when players are initially coordinated, no player ever revises their action. 
That is, there is no information transmission. Next, we show that in 
all equilibria, when players are initially miscoordinated, there must be 
some information transmission occurring.
Proposition 5. There is an equilibrium in which, when both players are 
initially coordinated, no player ever revises their action, irrespective of 
the state of the world.
Proof. Consider the initial action profile (X, x ) and the strategy in 
which Player 1 does not revise her action when both players are initially 
coordinate. If Player 1 does not revise her action the Player 2’s belief 
remain constant at 1/2. Given that, it is optimal for him to remain 
coordinated with P1 on (X, X ).
If Player 1 deviates, we are free to assign any beliefs to Player 2. If we 
assume that Player 2 believes Player 1 deviates to (Y, X ) only when the 
state is y, then as Player 2 is the strong player he will not revise his ac-
tion unless less than τ2 remains until the deadline, making such a devi-
ation for Player 1 not profitable.
Proposition 6. When both players are initially miscoordinated, there will 
be some – but not full – information transmission.
Proof. Assume that the initial prepared profile is (X, Y ) and there is 
no information transmission in equilibrium - that is, Player 1 chooses to 
switch to Y if given a revision opportunity with probability α(t) > 0 that 
is independent on whether the state of the world is x or y. In that case, 
the belief of Player 2 remains constant at 1/2, and it is optimal for Play-
er 2 to coordinate with Player 1 at the first revision opportunity. This, in 
turns, gives incentives to Player 1 not to switch to Y when the state of 
the world is y.
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Note that there cannot be full information transmission: if the deadline 
is very far, it is not beneficial for P1 to reveal the state of the world, as 
Player 2 will have enough time to prepared his prepared action.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we introduce one-sided incomplete information in the 
study of coordination games with a preparation phase. In a common 
interest game, the informed player always signals her information 
through her prepared action, unless the deadline is too close, in which 
case she simply best respond to the other player’s prepared action. The 
uninformed player always prefers to be coordinated with the informed 
player.
In a coordination game with opposing interest, each player has a 
different preferred Nash equilibrium which depends on the state of the 
world. In particular, when the informed player receives less revision 
opportunities on average, she will be willing to signal the state of the 
world through her prepared action. When the informed player receives 
more revision opportunities on average, some information will still be 
transmitted, although not fully.
There are several ways in which information asymmetries could be 
extended in this model:
•  Increasing asymmetric information: Initially, both players could be 
uninformed about the state of the world. Player 1 would then receive 
some binary information according to an independent Poisson process 
for news arrival. Hwang (2018) studies a dynamic trading game with 
increasing asymmetric information.
•  Uncertainty about the type of game: One or both players could 
be unsure as to whether they are playing an opposing or common 
interest game.
•  Uncertainty about the arrival rates: The arrival rates play an impor- 
tant role in determining the outcome of the revision game, since 
the strong player has some commitment power he can use to push 
forward his preferred action. If one player is uncertain about the 
arrival rate of the other player, can the other player then pass as a 
strong player?
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Appendix
A. Common Interest Game
a) V(Y, X, x, t) for t Close to 0
For ease of notations, let us use f(t) instead of V(Y, X, x, t). We solve 
the following first-order differential equation:
f '(t) + (λ1 + λ2)f (t) = λ1 + λ2d
subject to the terminal condition f (0) = 0.
We first consider the homogeneous equation f '(t) + (λ1 + λ2)f(t) = 0, 
which can be rewritten as f '(t) / f (t) = − (λ1 + λ2), f (t) ≠ 0. Integrating 
gives us ∫(f '(t) / f (t))dt = – (λ1 + λ2)t + β, that is f (t) = αe
−(λ1 + λ2)t, where α is 
a positive constant.
We now look for a solution to the inhomogeneous equation of the 
form f (t) = α(t)e− (λ1 + λ2)t. Taking the derivative, we get f '(t) = α'(t)e− (λ1 + λ2)t – (λ1 
+ λ2)α(t)e
− (λ1 + λ2)t = α'(t)e− (λ1 + λ2)t – (λ1 + λ2)f(t). Substituting in our origi-
nal equation, we get α'(t)e− (λ1 + λ2)t = λ1 + λ2d, which gives us α(t) = λ1 + 
λ2de
(λ1 + λ2)t / (λ1 + λ2) + K. Substituting, into f, we get f (t) = (λ1 + λ2d) / (λ1 + 
λ2) + Ke
− (λ1 + λ2)t, and using the terminal condition f (0) = 0, we find K = 
− (λ1 + λ2d) / (λ1 + λ2), so that
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b) U(X, X, px (t), t) for t ≥ τ1
Again, for ease of notation, let use h(t) and g(t) such that h(t) = U(X, X, 
px(t), t) and g(t) = U(Y, X, 1, t).




where (see Equation 18)
 2 1 2 1( ) ( ) 1( ) (1 ) ( ),
t tg t e d e gλ τ λ τ τ− − − −= − +
and (see Equation 15)
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Plugging into the original differential equation, we get
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which gives us, for t = τ1,
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Given the terminal condition h(τ1) = p
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c) U(X, Y, px(t), t) for t ≥ τ1
As previously, for ease of notation, let use h(t) and g(t) such that h(t) 
= U(X, X, px(t), t) and g(t) = U(Y, X, 1, t). Let us also use z for z(t) = U(X, 
Y, px(t), t).
We solve the following first-order differential equation
z'(t) + (λ1p
y(t) + λ2)z(t) = λ1p
y(t)d + λ2h(t),
subject to the terminal condition
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where
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Note that z (τ1) can be rewritten as
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1 1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )2 1
1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )2 2
1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
( ) (1 ) (1 )






z p e d e e
p e e d
p e d e
p
λ λ τ λ λ τ λ λ τ
λ λ τ λ λ τ
λ λ τ λ λ τ
λ λτ τ
λ λ λ λ
λ λτ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ
τ
λ λ λ λ
− + − + − +
− + − +
− + − +
 
= − + − + + + 
 
+ − + − + + 
 
= − + − − + + 
+ 1 2 1 1 2 1( ) ( )2 11
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
) (1 ) (1 )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , 0, ).x y
e e d
p g p U X Y
λ λ τ λ λ τλ λτ
λ λ λ λ
τ τ τ τ
− + − + − + − + + 
= +
First we solve the homogeneous equation
 1 2( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) 0,
yz t p t z tλ λ′ + + =
which can be rewritten as
 
1 2
( ) ( ( ) ).
( )





Given that 1ln ( )/ ( ),




ln ( ) ( ( ) )
ln ( ) ,
y
x
z t p t dt K
p t t K
λ λ
λ
= − + +
= − +
∫
so that 2( ) ( ) ,txz t p t e λα −=  with α	>	0.
215BAYESIAN REVISION GAMES
We now look for a solution of the type z(t) = α(t)px(t)e− λ2t, such that 
z'(t) = α'(t)px(t)e− λ2t – (λ1p
y(t) +λ2)z(t). Our differential equation then 
becomes






( ) 1( ) ( ).




p tt e d e h t
p t p t
λ λα λ λ′ = +
























p t e ddt e e ddt
p t
e e d K


















Let us now focus on the second term of the differential equation:
 
2 2
2 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 2 11 1
2 2
( ) ( )21
2
1 2 1 2




( )( ) (21
2














t tT t t
e h t e d
p t
p t e e e d
p t
e e g e
e d
e e e e
λ λ
λ λ τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ λ τ
λ
λ λ τλ λ τ
λ λ
λλλ





λ λ λ λ
− − − −
− − − − − −
− −− − − −
=
 + − + − − 






2 1 1 1 1 1
2
1 2 2 1 21 1 1 1
2 1 2 21 1 1 1 1
)





( ) 1 2 2
2











e e g e
e d
e e e e e e d
e e e e g e e
λ τ λ τ λ τ
λ
λ λ λ τ λλ λ λ τ















+ − + 
− 
=
 + − + − − 
+ − + 
− 




1 2 2 1 21 1 1 1




( )2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
( )2 2
1 2 1 2
1 ( )
( )











e h t dt e d
p t
e e e e e e d
e e e e g e e K
e d
p t e e
p t
λ λ
λ λ λ τ λλ λ λ τ





λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ
τ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ




 + − + + − − 







2 1 1 1 1 1
( )2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )2 1
1 2





e e g e K
λ τ




λ λ λ λ
− −
− − − − − −
 
 − 




2 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 2
( ) ( )2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )2 1
1













p tt e d e d
p t
p t e e e d
p t
e e g e K
λ λ
λ λ τ λ τ




λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ τ
λ λ λ λ
− − − −
− − − − − −
= +
+
 + − + + − − 
  + − + + − −   
and, since 2( ) ( ) ( ) ,txz t t p t e λα −=
2 1 1 1




( ) ( )2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )2 1
1
1 2 1 2
(2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1
y x
t ty
t tt t x
t tx y
z t p t d p t d
p t e e d
e e g e Kp t e
p t d Ke p t e
λ τ λ τ





λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ τ
λ λ λ λ
λ
λ λ
− − − −




 + − + + − − 
  + − + + − −   
 = + + −  −
1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
) ( )2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )2 1
1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )1
1 2
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
t
t t t
t t tx x y
t t
e d
e e g e
p t Ke p t d p t e e d
e e
τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ λ τ
λ λ τ λ τ




λ λ λ λ
λλ




− − − − − −
− − − − −
− − − −
  + − 
  + − +  − −   





2 1 2 1




( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )2 1
1












p t e e d
e e g
p t Ke h t p t e d g
λ τ
λ τ λ τ




λ λ λ λ
λ λ τ
λ λ λ λ
τ
− −
− − − −
− − − −
− − −
  + 
 + − − − 
  + −  − −   
= + + −
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2 1 1 1




( ) ( )2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )2 1
1
1 2 1 2
(2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1
y x
t ty
t tt t x
t tx y
z t p t d p t d
p t e e d
e e g e Kp t e
p t d Ke p t e
λ τ λ τ





λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ τ
λ λ λ λ
λ
λ λ
− − − −




 + − + + − − 
  + − + + − −   
 = + + −  −
1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
) ( )2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )2 1
1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )1
1 2
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
t
t t t
t t tx x y
t t
e d
e e g e
p t Ke p t d p t e e d
e e
τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ λ τ
λ λ τ λ τ




λ λ λ λ
λλ




− − − − − −
− − − − −
− − − −
  + − 
  + − +  − −   





2 1 2 1




( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )2 1
1












p t e e d
e e g
p t Ke h t p t e d g
λ τ
λ τ λ τ




λ λ λ λ
λ λ τ
λ λ λ λ
τ
− −
− − − −
− − − −
− − −
  + 
 + − − − 
  + −  − −   
= + + −
Evaluating at t = τ1, we get z(τ1) = p
x(τ1)Ke
−λ2τ1 + h(τ1) + p
y(τ1)[d – g(τ1)]. 
We now find the constant term by using the terminal condition, which 
we rewrote as z(τ1) = p
x(τ1)g(τ1) + p
y(τ1)U(X, Y, 0, τ1). Combining the two 
equalities gives us
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]{ }





1 1 1 1
1
1 ( )( ) ( ) ( , , 0, )
( ) ( )






pK e g h e U X Y d
p p
e g h p U X Y d
p




τ τ τ τ
τ
= − + −



















( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , 0, )
( )
( ) ( )
1 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , 0, )








z t p t Ke h t p t e d g
h t p t e e g h p U X Y d
p
p t e d g
















= + + −
= + − + −
+ −
  = + − + −  
 
[ ]}1( ) ( ) .yp t d g τ

+ −
B. Opposing Interest Game, Strong Player 1
a) U (X, X, px(t), t) for t ≥ τ1
This calculation is almost identical as the calculation in Apprendix A.b) 
and will therefore be kept to a minimum. Again, for ease of notation, let 
use h(t) and g(t) such that h(t) = U(X, X, px(t), t) and g(t) = U(Y, X, 1, t).
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We solve the following first-order differential equation:
 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
y yh t p t h t p t g tλ λ′ + =
where
 2 1 2 1( ) ( ) 1( ) (1 ) ( ),
t tg t e e gλ τ λ τ τ− − − −= − +
and
 
1 2 1 1 2 1( ) ( )2 1
1
1 2 1 2
( ) (1 ) (1 ) ,g e e dλ λ τ λ λ τλ λτ
λ λ λ λ
− + − += − + −
+ +
along with the terminal condition
 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ,
x yh p p dτ τ τ= +
where
 1( )
1( ) , ( ) 1 ( ).
1
x y x
T tp t p t p te λ− −
= = −
+
We first consider the homogeneous equation
 1( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
yh t p t h tλ′ + =
which has a solution of the form
 1( )
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
1
x
T th t t p t t e λ
α α − −= = +
Taking the derivative and plugging back in the original differential 
equation, we get
 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),





2 1 2 11




( ) ( )( )
1 1
( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1









t tT t T T
p tt g t
p t
e g t
e e e g
e e e e e e g
λ
λ τ λ τλ




λ λ λ τ
− −
− − − −− −








2 1 2 11




( ) ( )( )
1 1
( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1









t tT t T T
p tt g t
p t
e g t
e e e g
e e e e e e g
λ
λ τ λ τλ




λ λ λ τ
− −
− − − −− −







2 1 2 1( ) ( )1 1
1
1 2 1 2





p tt e e g K
p t
λ τ λ τλ λα τ
λ λ λ λ
− − − −  = − + + 
− −  
Hence
 
2 1 2 1( ) ( )1 1
1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ,
x
t ty x
h t t p t
p t e e g p t Kλ τ λ τ
α
λ λ τ
λ λ λ λ
− − − −
=
  = − + + 
− −  
which gives us, for t = τ1,
 
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) .y xh p g p Kλ λτ τ τ τ
λ λ λ λ
  = − + + 
− −  
Given the terminal condition h(τ1) = p
x(τ1) + p




1 1 2 1 2






τ λ λ τ
τ λ λ λ λ
  = + − + − 
− −  
so that
 
2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )





h t p t t
p t p t e e
e e g e d
λ τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ λ τ
α
λλ
λ λ λ λ
λ τ
λ λ
− − − −
− − − − − −
=
= + − +
− −
 + − +  − 
b) U(X, Y, px(t), t) for t ≥ τ1
This section is similar to Appendix A.c) and is therefore kept to a 
minimum. As previously, for ease of notation, let use h(t) and g(t) such 
that h(t) = U(X, X, px(t), t) and g(t) = U(Y, X, 1, t). Let us also use z for 
z(t) = U(X, Y, px(t), t).
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We solve the following first-order differential equation
z'(t) + (λ1p
y(t) + λ2)z(t) = λ1p
y(t)d + λ2h(t),










( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]
(1 )[ ( ) ( ) ],
x y
x y
z e p p d
















2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )21
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
[ ] ( )
t tx y
t t t
h t p t p t e e
e e g e d
λ τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ λ τ
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λ λ λ λ
λ τ
λ λ
− − − −
− − − − − −
= + − +
− −




1 2 1 1 2 1( ) ( )21
1
1 2 1 2
( ) (1 ) (1 ).g e d eλ λ τ λ λ τλλτ
λ λ λ λ
− + − += − + −
+ +
Note that z(τ1) can be rewritten as (see (12))
 z(τ1) = p
x(τ1)g(τ1) + p
y(τ1).
First we solve the homogeneous equation z'(t) + (λ1p
y(t) + λ2)z(t) = 0 and 
get a solution of the type z(t) = α(t)px(t)e−λ2t. Our original differential 
equation then becomes
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Let us now focus on the second term of the differential equation:
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e e g e d
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λ λ λ
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λ λ τ
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p t e e e
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e e g e d K
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λ λ τ λ τ




λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ τ
λ λ λ λ
− − − −





  + − + + − −   
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2 1 1 1 1 1
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λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ τ
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  + − + + − −   
and, since z(t) = α(t)px(t)e−λ2t,
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  + − + + − −   
= + + −
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 + − +  − 
 + − − − 
  + −  − −   
= + + [ ]2 1( ) 1) 1 ( ) .tt e gλ τ τ− − −
 
Evaluating at t = τ1, we get z(τ1) = p
x(τ1)Ke
−λ2τ1 + h(τ1) + p
y(τ1)[1 – g(τ1)]. We 
now find the constant term by using the terminal condition, which we 
rewrote as z(τ1) = p
x(τ1)g(τ1) + p
y(τ1). Combining the two equalities gives us
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